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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
*****
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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District Court No. CVOC-2015-14630
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III.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff-Respondent Allen G. Nettleton’s (“Nettleton”) brief asserts that DefendantAppellant Canyon Outdoor Media, LLC (“Canyon Outdoor”) was not entitled to submit a motion
for reconsideration to the trial court. This assertion is contrary to the express language of Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)(2)(B). As addressed in Canyon Outdoor’s Appellant’s Brief, and
further addressed below, Canyon Outdoor was permitted to ask the trial court to reconsider its
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment and the trial court
was required to consider the new and additional information presented with Canyon Outdoor’s
Motion for Reconsideration. In addition, Nettleton’s assertion that a February 28, 2014
agreement, which modified the rates at which Nettleton’s variable compensation component
were paid set forth the entire agreement between the parties is not supported by the record. For
these reasons, Canyon Outdoor respectfully requests that the Court reverse the trial court’s
determination that Canyon Outdoor was not entitled to summary judgment, the trial court’s
determination that Nettleton was entitled to summary judgment, the trial court’s determination
that Canyon Outdoor was not entitled to an award of costs and attorney’s fees, and the trial
court’s determination that Nettleton was entitled to an award of costs and attorney’s fees.
IV.
A. CANYON OUTDOOR
RECONSIDERATION

WAS

ARGUMENT
ENTITLED

TO

FILE

A

MOTION

FOR

In this situation, Canyon Outdoor’s Motion for Reconsideration was filed after entry of a
final judgment and the trial court was required to consider any new admissible evidence or
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authority bearing on the correctness of the Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Cross Motions
for Summary Judgment. Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012).
Nettleton’s statement that Canyon Outdoor “was precluded from moving for reconsideration of
the order for summary judgment” is contrary to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11. See
Respondent’s Brief at p. 13; I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)(2)(B),
which was in effect when Canyon Outdoor’s Motion for Reconsideration was filed, expressly
provided that a motion for reconsideration may be brought after entry of a final judgment.
I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B) A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory order of the trial court
may be made at any time before the entry of final judgment, but not later than fourteen days after
the entry of the final judgment. In re Estate of Lanham, 160 Idaho 89, 93, 369 P.3d 307, 311 (Ct.
App. 2016) (“A motion to reconsider any order of the trial court entered before final judgment
may be made at any time prior to or within 14 days after the entry of a final judgment.”) 1 In re
Estate of Lanham did not provide a basis for the trial court to decline to rule on Canyon
Outdoor’s Motion for Reconsideration. The facts presented in In re Estate of Lanham are distinct
from the facts in this matter and cannot be reconciled. There the Idaho Court of Appeals held that
when a trial court fails to rule on a motion for reconsideration filed prior to the entry of a final
judgment, the motion for reconsideration is deemed to have been denied. Id. citing State v.
Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 61, 343 P.3d 497, 503 (2015). In this situation, Canyon Outdoor’s Motion
for Reconsideration was filed after the trial court entered the Judgment.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)(2)(B) allowed two separate approaches to filing
1

I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B) is similar to I.R.C.P. 11.2(b)(1) which became effective July 1, 2016.
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motions to reconsider interlocutory order. Agrisource, Inc. v. Johnson, 156 Idaho 903, 911, 332
P.3d 815, 823 (2014). Parties could either file a motion to reconsider before a final judgment was
entered or file a motion to reconsider within fourteen days after entry of a final judgment. Id.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)(2)(B) provided a party one more chance after entry of a final
judgment to ask the court to decide the law and facts correctly. Id. at 913, 825. This additional
opportunity after entry of a final judgment “ensures the district court decides a case on the proper
law and facts.” Id. Canyon Outdoor’s Motion for Reconsideration requested reconsideration of
the trial court’s Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment
and was filed within 14 days of entry of the trial court’s Judgment. Accordingly, Canyon
Outdoor’s Motion for Reconsideration is similar to the second motion for reconsideration filed
by Appellant in Agrisource, Inc. v. Johnson. See Id. at 912, 824. The Idaho Supreme Court
determined that the Appellant’s second motion for reconsideration “was proper because (1) it
moved the court to reconsider the court’s orders on summary judgment and [Appellant’s] first
motion to reconsider, which were both interlocutory orders; and (2) [Appellant] made it within
fourteen days of the June 14, 2012 Judgment, which was a final judgment.” Id.
The fact that the trial court’s Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Cross Motions for
Summary Judgment and the Judgment were entered on the same day does not change the
interlocutory nature of the Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Cross Motions for Summary
Judgment. “When an order granting summary judgment is filed before a final judgment, that
order is an interlocutory order.” Id. at 911, 823. In addition to the Memorandum Decision and
Order Re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment and the Judgment being two separate
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documents, the Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment
cannot be considered a final judgment by itself. Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a),
a final judgment is not permitted to contain the court's legal reasoning, findings of fact, or
conclusions of law. I.R.C.P. 54(a). The trial court’s Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Cross
Motions for Summary Judgment consists of the very elements that a final judgment is prohibited
from containing. R., pp. 201-208.
In addition, Canyon Outdoor was not required to assert or present facts in the summary
judgment proceeding in order for the trial court to be required to consider those facts when
Canyon Outdoor presented them in conjunction with its Motion for Reconsideration. Whether
the information submitted by Canyon Outdoor with its Motion for Reconsideration would have
been timely pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), is not the appropriate standard for
consideration of whether the trial court was required to consider the information submitted by
Canyon Outdoor. See Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont Cty., 152 Idaho 207, 211, 268 P.3d 1159, 1163
(2012). In Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont Cty., the Idaho Supreme Court determined that it was
improper to strike an affidavit submitted in support of a motion for reconsideration on the basis
that it was untimely under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Id. Rather, Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 11(a)(2)(B) governed the submission of the affidavit. Id. As such, Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 11(a)(2)(B) rather than Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) governed the trial court’s
consideration of the new and additional information Canyon Outdoor brought to the trial court’s
attention in conjunction with Canyon Outdoor’s Motion for Reconsideration. Id. In addition,
Nettleton did not move to strike the new and additional information Canyon Outdoor brought to
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the trial court’s attention in the Plaintiff’s Verified Response to Defendant’s Motion for
Reconsideration and is not entitled to do so now. R., pp. 403-409.
B. THE FEBRUARY 28, 2014 COMMISSION RATE MODIFICATION AGREEMENT
DID NOT CONSTITUTE THE ENTIRE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES
Nettleton mischaracterizes the significance of the February 28, 2014 Agreement. The
February 28, 2014 Agreement modified a single term of the employment agreement between
Nettleton and Canyon Outdoor, the rates at which the variable portion of Nettleton’s
compensation was determined. R., p. 65 at ¶14. The February 28, 2014 Agreement was not the
entire agreement between Canyon Outdoor and Nettleton, it did not address the base component
of Nettleton’s compensation and it did not address Nettleton’s duties with Canyon Outdoor. Id.
The February 28, 2014 Agreement could not have been the entire agreement between Canyon
Outdoor and Nettleton because it did not address the services Nettleton actually performed for
Canyon Outdoor and for which Canyon Outdoor paid Nettleton a significant portion of his
overall compensation, at least $38,000.00 over the course of Nettleton’s time with Canyon
Outdoor. R., pp. 63-65. More importantly, the February 28, 2014 Agreement did not create an
obligation for Canyon Outdoor to pay Nettleton commission relating to “new contracts” after
Nettleton terminated his employment with Canyon Outdoor. R., p. 65 at ¶14.
It is important to carefully use the word “commission” when analyzing whether Nettleton
is entitled to post-termination compensation. Nettleton received a fixed component of
compensation and variable component of compensation. R., p. 65 at ¶12. The variable
component of compensation was not a commission in the sense that Nettleton could obtain an
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advertiser for Canyon Outdoor and then never interact with that advertiser again. R., pp. 30, 37,
45, and 63-65. At a minimum, there was an evidentiary conflict regarding this issue that could
not be resolved without the consideration of witness credibility.
Nettleton had the burden of proving that his agreement with Canyon Outdoor included a
term that required payment of the variable portion of compensation after Nettleton terminated his
employment. However, the only evidence in the record was Nettleton’s subjective belief that he
was entitled to receive compensation after he terminated his employment. R., p. 35 and 43.
Nettleton testified that the February 28, 2014 agreement did not entitled him to the variable
portion of his compensation after his resignation. R., p. 43. Nettleton also testified that postseparation payment of the variable portion of his compensation was not offered or promised to
him by Canyon Outdoor. R., p. 35. Yet Nettleton asserts that because he believed he was entitled
to post-separation compensation that he is entitled to it. Nettleton’s subjective belief that he was
entitled to compensation following his resignation is not sufficient. R. p. 89; See J.R. Simplot Co.
v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 614, 167 P.3d 748, 751 (2006). As previously addressed in Appellant’s
Brief, the trial court erred when it determined that Nettleton had established a “course of
dealing” that established Nettleton was entitled to post-separation compensation. R. p. 207. In
this situation, the parties had not previously applied the term of the employment agreement upon
which Nettleton seeks to enforce and as such could not create a “course of dealing.” Pocatello
Hosp., LLC v. Quail Ridge Med. Inv'r, LLC, 156 Idaho 709, 721, 330 P.3d 1067, 1079 (2014)
Even if Nettleton was able to demonstrate from the record that he was entitled to postseparation compensation, it was improper for the trial court to infer that there was no
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requirement for Nettleton to service contracts in order to be entitled to compensation. R., p. 207.
The information before the trial court was the written testimony of Curtis Massood that Nettleton
was required to service contracts and the written testimony of Nettleton that he was not required
to service contracts. R. pp. 62-67, 88-91, 152-153. This constitutes an evidentiary conflict
analogous to the evidentiary conflict addressed by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Argyle v.
Slemaker. Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 670, 691 P.2d 1283, 1285 (Ct. App. 1984). There
the Idaho Court of Appeals determined that summary judgment was inappropriate when an
evidentiary conflict could not be resolved without the consideration of witness testimony. Id.
Specifically, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that “such a determination should not be made on
summary judgment if credibility can be tested by testimony in court before the trier of fact.” Id.
The conflicts between Curtis Massood and Nettleton’s testimony could not be resolved without
the trial court implicitly considering the witnesses’ credibility. Accordingly, it was not
appropriate for the trial court to resolve this evidentiary conflict at summary judgment.
C. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACT PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE SECTION
45-612
Canyon Outdoor was required to defend against Nettleton’s false claim for compensation
based on “renewal contracts.” Not only did the trial court err by failing to award Canyon
Outdoor its attorney’s fees and costs incurred defending against Nettleton’s claim for
compensation based on “renewal contracts”, but the trial court awarded Nettleton attorney’s fees
which included attorney’s fees incurred by Nettleton pursuing a false claim. R., p. 433. Idaho
Code Section 45-612(2) did not allow the trial court the discretion to deny Canyon Outdoor an
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award of the attorney’s fees and costs incurred defending against Nettleton’s false claim. I.C. §
45-612. Idaho Code Section 45-612(2) provides as follows:
Any employee initiating a civil proceeding to collect unpaid wages or other
compensation, which is based in whole or in part on a false claim which the
employee knew to be false at the time the employee brought the action, shall
be liable for attorney’s fees and costs incurred by the employer in defending
against the false claim.
I.C. § 45-612(2). Regardless of whether Nettleton had a subjective belief that he was entitled to
post-separation compensation, Nettleton signed the February 24, 2014 Agreement. R., p. 33.
Moreover, Nettleton received compensation from Canyon Outdoor for over a year utilizing the
tiered rate structure set forth by the February 24, 2014 Agreement. R., pp. 248-271. There were
several months during that time in which Nettleton was not entitled to commission relating to
“renewal contracts” pursuant to that tiered rate structure. R., pp. 252, 256, 258, 264, 265, and
266. Any argument that he was somehow unaware of how the commission tier structure set forth
by the February 24, 2014 Agreement operated when he filed the Verified Complaint is
disingenuous.
Nettleton’s assertion that he “did not raise a specific claim for compensation in the form
of commissions due from ‘renewal contracts’” in the Respondent’s Brief does not reflect the
actual language of Nettleton’s Verified Complaint or Amended Verified Complaint.
Respondent’s Brief at 18. Paragraphs 4 to 9 of Nettleton’s Verified Complaint and Amended
Verified Complaint allege as follows:
4. During such employment, Employee was a salesman for Employer, procuring
new and renewing contracts with third-party advertisers for advertising on
Employer's billboards.
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5. Employee was paid a base salary and commissions on his sales.
6. Employee's commissions were based on a percentage of the gross revenue from
each of the new or renewing contracts he procured, and paid on a monthly basis
as each advertiser paid on its contract over its term.
7. The terms of some of the contracts Employee had procured had not expired at
the time of his separation, and the advertisers have continued to make monthly
payments thereon to Employer after Employee's separation.
8. Employee is entitled to his commissions on these contracts, in at least the total
amount of $24,047.50; and such portion thereof as is attributable to the
advertisers' payments made on such contracts to date is due and payable now, and
the remainder shall be due and payable upon receipt by Employer.
9. Such commissions are part of Employee's financial compensation for his labor
and services on behalf of Employer and constitute "wages" within the meaning of
Idaho Code Section 45-601.
R., pp. 10-11(emphasis added). Nettleton’s Verified Complaint and Amended Verified
Complaint specifically alleged that he was entitled to post-separation compensation based on the
new and renewing contracts he procured. Id. Moreover, the discovery requests Nettleton
submitted to Canyon Outdoor incorporated two exhibits, one that addressed “renewal contracts”
and one that addressed “new contracts”. R., p. 233; R., pp. 386-387; R., p. 410. Exhibit A was a
list of “renewal contracts” that Nettleton asserted were contracts he procured with existing
customers of Canyon Outdoor and from which he sought compensation from Canyon Outdoor.
R. pp. 382-385; R., p. 410. Nettleton required Canyon Outdoor to provide information relating to
payments received from Canyon Outdoor’s advertisers for the “renewal contracts” listed on
Exhibit A. R., pp. 386-387; R., p. 410. Nettleton continued to deny that he was not entitled to
commissions relating to “renewal contracts” in January of 2016. R, pp. 376 and 388. Nettleton’s
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counsel finally conceded at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment that Nettleton was
not entitled to commission on renewal contracts and that they were there “just to talk about the
new contracts”. Tr., pp.9-10, ll. 23-25 and 1-2.
Whether or not Nettleton sought compensation for “renewal contracts” in his Cross
Motion for Summary Judgment, does not alter the fact that $24,047.50 sought in the Verified
Complaint and Amended Verified Complaint included $8,433.75 in compensation relating to
renewal contracts or Canyon Outdoor’s successful defense of Nettleton’s false claim. R., pp.
379-388; R., p. 392; R., p. 410. Nettleton did not acknowledge that he was not entitled to
compensation based on “renewal contracts” until after Canyon Outdoor’s motion for summary
judgment was filed. It is also important to consider that Nettleton’s counsel responded only that
he was in agreement with Canyon Outdoor’s position as to renewal contracts. Tr., pp.9-10, ll. 2325 and 1-2. Nettleton’s counsel did not deny that Nettleton had previously been seeking
compensation based on the renewal contracts.” Id. Regardless of the Court’s determination as to
whether Nettleton prevailed on his claim for compensation relating to “new contracts”, Canyon
Outdoor prevailed as to Nettleton’s false claim for compensation relating to “renewal contracts”
and was entitled to an award of its attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending against the
false claim. I.C. § 45-612(2).
In addition, it was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to enter an award of attorney’s
fees in Nettleton’s favor that included attorney’s fees incurred relating to the pursuit of the claim
for compensation relating to “renewal contracts.” This position is not based on Nettleton’s failure
to segregate attorney’s fees for the claim relating to new contracts for which the trial court
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determined that Nettleton prevailed. Rather, this position is based upon the policy set forth by
Idaho Code Section 45-612(2). I.C. § 45-612(2). Idaho Code Section 45-612 would not provide
its intended effect of reimbursing employers for the successful defense of a false claim if the
employee that brought the false claim is awarded attorney’s fees incurred in bringing the false
claim. Id. The issue before this Court is whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion.
This Court “must consider (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3)
whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho
893, 902, 104 P.3d 367, 376 (2004)(internal citations omitted). In this situation, the trial court
was required to consider Idaho Code Section 45-612 in addition to the factors set forth in Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e).
V.

CONCLUSION

Canyon Outdoor respectfully requests that the Court reverse the trial court’s
determination that Canyon Outdoor was not entitled to summary judgment, the trial court’s
determination that Nettleton was entitled to summary judgment, the trial court’s determination
that Canyon Outdoor was not entitled to an award of costs and attorney’s fees, and the trial
court’s determination that Nettleton was entitled to an award of costs and attorney’s fees.
Canyon Outdoor also requests an award of its costs and attorney’s fees on appeal as the
prevailing party on appeal.
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DATED this 27th day of June, 2017.
WORST, FITZGERALD & STOVER, PLLC

By:

VI.

/s/ Louis V. Spiker
Louis V. Spiker

_____________
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Dinius & Associates, PLLC
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Overnight Mail
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/s/ Louis V. Spiker
Louis V. Spiker

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF - 12

